aristro.doc [A] THE RUSSELL-ENGLISH DEFENCE
(A1) The linguistic phenomenon of referential uses of descriptions-the RefUse phenomenon, let us call it-occurs in English, i.e. amongst speakers of English.
(The claim to be rebutted is that this phenomenon is a counterexample to RTD.) (A2) Let Russell-English be a language which (as much as possible) is like English except that RTD is stipulated to be correct. (A3) The RefUse phenomenon would still occur in a community which spoke RussellEnglish. (A4) Hence, by CP, the fact that that phenomenon occurs in English does not disprove the hypothesis that RTD is (provides) a correct analysis of English.
(Actually, this is not wholly correct, but it will do for present purposes. Kripke in fact distinguishes three Russellian languages: 'weak', 'intermediate' and 'strong' (1977, p. 16) . The above argument is not applicable in the case of strong Russell-English: in that language descriptions are explicitly banned, so there wouldn't be any uses, let alone referential uses, of descriptions. Let me stipulate that, forthwith, by 'Russell-English' I shall mean intermediate Russell-English, wherein 'sentences containing definite descriptions are taken to be abbreviations or paraphrases of their Russellian analyses' (Kripke 1977, p. 16) ). Back to the argument. It is valid. The Counterexample Principle, CP, appears beyond reproach: if a phenomenon, P, would occur (even) if a certain theory were correct, P's actual occurrence could hardly be regarded as disproving, as conclusively establishing the falsity of, that theory. (A1) is uncontroversial-it is at any rate accepted by both sides of the dispute. And the introduction of the hypothetical language in (A2) certainly seems viable. RTD would be correct by stipulation, for example, in a language similar to English but where sentences of the form 'the F is G' were, by explicit definition and common understanding, merely abbreviations for sentences of the form 'there is exactly one F and whatever is F is G'.
2 So, we are left with only (A3), the apparent finding of Kripke's thought-experiment, as a potential target for critics. And, sure enough, this is precisely what is questioned by those who are not persuaded by Kripke's argument-see e.g. Benfield and Erwin (1975) , Devitt (1981) and Millican (1990) .
An objection of Devitt's points up a possible limitation of Kripke's argument. Devitt suggests that in light of the explicit stipulation in Russell-English governing the use of descriptions, speakers of Russell-English would simply deploy the alternative expressions available to them-viz. demonstratives, pronouns, and proper names-to talk of any specific objects they had in mind, i.e. in current parlance, to express objectdependent propositions (Devitt 1981, p. 520) . If Devitt is right, (A3) is false: it just is not true that speakers of Russell-English would use descriptions referentially.
The most likely response to this objection, I suspect, would be to the effect that Devitt has placed more weight on Kripke's use of the phrase 'would' than Kripke aristro.doc intended or requires. It is not important for Kripke's argument, the response continues, if Russell-English speakers would not generally use descriptions to convey objectdependent propositions; all that is required is that referential uses of descriptions would occur now and then. Indeed, Kripke's argument goes through if we simply read the 'would's as 'could's-and Devitt's objection is then beside the point.
This response appears to be entirely adequate. To begin with, reading the 'would' in CP as a 'could' certainly appears to preserve validity: if phenomenon P could occur while a certain theory were also true, P's actual occurrence surely could not be regarded as disproving that theory. And the corresponding reading of (A3), viz. that the RefUse phenomenon could occur in a community of Russell-English speakers, also appears above board. For, even though we may agree with Devitt that Russell-English speakers would generally use the alternative devices (demonstratives, etc.) to talk about specific objects, we cannot rule out the possibility of their occasionally using descriptions for this purpose too. As Kripke notes in the course of defending (A3) (1977, p. 17) , an uncontroversially quantificational phrase may be used even in English to convey objectdependent propositions. For example, I may utter the words 'A dashing Asian philosopher wishes to be somewhere else' with the intention, and every expectation, of conveying that I wished to be somewhere else. It is highly plausible, then, that a RussellEnglish speaker may use 'the'-which in her community is an uncontroversially quantificational phrase-to convey an object-dependent proposition.
3 In that case, the 'could'-reading of (A3) comes out true.
So, as I say, this response to Devitt seems entirely adequate. However, it does betray a limitation of the original argument. If, as the response suggests, the ambiguity theorist is foiled by the occurrence of even one-off referential uses of explicit quantifierexpressions, she must be seen as maintaining something approximating the following view: that each and every use one makes of an expression marks out a semantic value that has to be accounted for by our semantic theory. Now, this may well be the position Kripke is attacking, and may well be the position suggested by Donnellan's considerations-for the ambiguity thesis is here supported by appeal to cases of 'misdescription', cases where the descriptions do not even apply to the objects picked out. But the view itself is manifestly barmy. Had I, for example, uttered 'A dashing Asian lecturer wishes to be somewhere else' to convey that I was embarrassed, this view has it that a correct semantic theory should yield the intended proposition as one out of many possible semantic values of the uttered sentence. Frankly, I can't see anyone but the imaginary adversary Kripke has constructed from Donnellan's remarks holding this view.
Hence, although the argument, read as the above response requires, may serve Kripke's purposes-to show 'that the considerations in Donnellan's paper, by themselves, do not refute Russell's theory ' (1977, p. 6 )-its potential against better motivated ambiguity theories is called into question. After all, the ambiguity thesis isn't that implausible. What makes it worthy of consideration is the fact that the referential aristro.doc use of descriptions, in contrast to the referential use of explicitly quantificational phrases, is a most common phenomenon, as actual uses of descriptions go (consider e.g. 'The dog bit my toe', 'I like the table you bought last week', 'Jones fell down the stairs'). Thus, one may build a case for the ambiguity thesis not merely on the fact that the RefUse phenomenon occurs, but on the fact that the phenomenon is commonplace. I am not saying that this would be a particularly good case for the thesis, but it seems to me that Kripke's argument would not be so forceful in such a case. For now the third premiss, (A3), must be read as affirming that the RefUse phenomenon would still be commonplace in a community which spoke Russell-English. But, this is precisely what Devitt-on the face of it, quite rightly-disputes.
Maybe the Kripkean can find an alternative way of modifying the argument in such cases, but the defence of RTD in the face of the ambiguity thesis is at any rate not as straightforward as the literature suggests. 4 Let us now consider Kripke's schmidentity argument, which apparently uses the same kind of thought-experiment not just to defend a semantic theory, but also to refute a rival.
III
The Schmidentity Argument(s). Kripke's original schmidentity argument is targetted at those who may be moved by the informativeness (nontriviality) of certain identity sentences to posit that an identity sentence really expresses a relation between the referring expressions flanking the identity sign rather than a relation between the object(s) referred to. Consider (1) and (2), for example:
Bruce Wayne is Bruce Wayne.
If identity sentences merely expressed (affirmed) a relation between the individuals named, or referred to, therein-call this the objectual account of identity- (1) and (2) would have precisely the same content. Yet, the Joker would find (1) informative and (2) trivial. Driven by the conviction that the informativeness of a sentence stems from its content, one may then be led to posit instead that (1) and (2) in fact express a relation, the co-reference relation perhaps, between the names themselves (call this the metalinguistic account). In that case, (1) and (2) would differ in content: (1) would be about two linguistic entities, the names 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman', whereas (2) would concern only one, viz. 'Bruce Wayne'. Kripke argues, however, that this metalinguistic move would not actually resolve our original problem:
If anyone ever inclines to this particular account of identity, let's suppose we gave him his account. Suppose identity were a relation in English between the names. I shall introduce an artificial relation called 'schmidentity' (not a word of English) which I now stipulate to hold only between an object and itself. Now then, the question of whether Cicero is schmidentical with Tully can arise, and if it does arise the same problems will hold for this statement as were thought in the case of our original identity statement to give the belief that this was a relation between the names. (Kripke 1980, p. 108) 5 The thrust of Kripke's reasoning seems fairly straightforward. Consider the following schmidentity sentences:
Bruce Wayne is schmidentical with Batman. (4) Bruce Wayne is schmidentical with Bruce Wayne.
Supposing that the Joker were aware of the definition of 'schmidentity', it is clear that he nevertheless would find (3) informative and (4) trivial. But, in that case, schmidentity sentences give rise to pretty much the same problem (re informativeness) that identity sentences do. We can recast this point to construct a defence of the objectual account of identity sentences along the lines of [A], the Russell-English Defence:
[B] THE SCHMIDENTITY DEFENCE (B1) English identity sentences can be informative. (The claim to be rebutted is that this phenomenon disproves the objectual account of identity.) (B2) Let Schmenglish be a language which (as much as possible) is like English except that the objectual account is stipulated to be correct. (Thus, in Schmenglish, identity sentences express the schmidentity of objects.) (B3) Some identity sentences would still be informative in a community which spoke Schmenglish. (Surely, if the people of Gotham City spoke Schmenglish, the Joker would still find (1) informative and (2) trivial.) (B4) Hence, by CP, the fact that English identity sentences are informative does not disprove the hypothesis that the objectual account of identity is correct for English.
6
5 The reader will note that whereas Kripke talks as if (the relation of) identity itself were at issue, I have set up the dispute as concerning the (literal) content of identity sentences. Since advocates of the metalinguistic account read (1) as affirming something along the lines of: 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman' co-refer, they presumably would accept that (1) is true if and only if the referent of 'Bruce Wayne' is identical (not to mention, schmidentical) with the referent of 'Batman'; for, the co-reference relation is surely 'parasitic' on the identity relation. To my mind, then, the dispute is really about what identity sentences express, not identity itself. 6 Kripke apparently considers his schmidentity argument to involve essentially the same line of reasoning as his Russell-English argument: he rehearses the essentials of the schmidentityargument immediately after the passage where he expounds CP, to serve as an example of CP's
This argument differs from [A] in the following respect, however. While the Russell-English Defence appeals to the use of descriptions in the Russell-English scenario, the Schmidentity Defence appeals merely to the informativeness of identity sentences in the Schmenglish scenario. Thus, the question of whether identity sentences would actually be uttered or not, or of how commonly they would be uttered (with suchand-such purpose), amongst Schmenglish speakers is simply irrelevant to the success of the schmidentity argument. All that is required is that people would find some identity sentences informative. And, surely, identity sentences would be informative even amongst Schmenglish speakers. Indeed, our intuition, I take it, is that English identity sentences contain precisely the same information as their Schmenglish counterparts. So, I think the Schmidentity Defence does successfully establish that the informativeness phenomenon is not a counterexample to the objectual account of identity.
However, there is another-and one would think, significant-point of disanalogy between the two arguments, [A] and [B] . As well as arguing that Russell's theory is not refuted by the RefUse phenomenon, Kripke also suggests how supporters of RTD can account for that phenomenon within the framework of a general theory of pragmatics. In the case of [B] , however, there is no accompanying account of informativeness. In short, we are left with two rival accounts of natural language identity sentences, neither of which (if Kripke is right) is refuted by the informativeness phenomenon, but only one of which, the metalinguistic account, as yet promises any kind of explanation of that phenomenon. One might well think, then, that this is reason enough to embrace the metalinguistic account; that it wins by default, as it were. But at this point Kripke's reasoning takes an ingenious turn; immediately after noting that identity and schmidentity sentences give rise to the same informativeness problem, he says:
If anyone thinks about this seriously, I think he will see that therefore probably his original account of identity [sentences] was not necessary, and probably not possible, for the problems it was originally meant to solve, and that therefore it should be dropped (Kripke 1980, p. 108) . This is the 'added twist' I mentioned earlier. As we have noted, the Joker would find (3) more informative than (4). But the comparative informativeness of (3) cannot in this case be put down to its affirming a relation between the names 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman', for the definition of 'schmidentity' manifestly dictates that a schmidentity sentence involving names affirms a relation between the individuals named, not the names. So, we have pretty much the same problem we started off with, but the solution (explanation) we formerly adopted is simply not applicable in this instance. The moral use (1977, p. 16) , and he also refers to the schmidentity argument in the succeeding footnote (fn. 23). 7 This means, moreover, that, unlike the Russell-English Defence, the success of the Schmidentity Defence does not depend on our reading 'would' charitably.
aristro.doc would appear to be the moral Kripke in fact draws: that that solution does not get to the heart of the real problem; that, in other words, the proffered explanation is not the correct explanation. The tables are thereby turned; what otherwise would have been merely a defence of the objectual account of identity is transformed into an attack against the metalinguistic account.
We must distinguish, then, between the defensive line of reasoning exemplified by argument [B] and the offensive line exemplified by the following argument:
[C] THE SCHMIDENTITY ATTACK (C1) The metalinguistic account of identity sentences provides an explanation of the informativeness of English identity sentences. (C2) Schmenglish identity sentences would also be informative. (C3) But the metalinguistic explanation, by stipulation, cannot be correct for the informativeness of Schmenglish identity sentences. (C4) So, the metalinguistic explanation does not really get to the heart of the informativeness problem. (C5) Hence, the metalinguistic explanation is probably not the correct explanation of the informativeness of English identity sentences. Now, even though Kripke suggests that his schmidentity argument is of the same form as his Russell-English argument (see fn. 6), it is clear, given Kripke's added twist, that it is the Schmidentity Attack, not the Schmidentity Defence, which best captures the thrust of Kripke's original reasoning. Of course, the defensive line is available to him as well; but it is important to see that we have two distinct lines of reasoning here. To be sure, they rely on the same thought-experiment; that is, on the same intuitions concerning the hypothetical language Schmenglish-for (C2) is none other than (B3); but, quite apart from the different conclusions, these arguments are 'driven' by different principles. The defensive version is driven by CP, the Counterexample Principle, while the offensive form is driven by a tacit principle to the effect, roughly speaking, that like linguistic phenomena must have like explanations.
8 This second principle, call it the Explanatory Principle (EP), is surely plausible; and if we accept it, the premisses in the Schmidentity Attack all seem 'accounted' for: (C1) is a given; (C2) we presumably have already accepted (under the label (B3)); (C3) seems to follow straightforwardly from Kripke's stipulative definition of 'schmidentity'; (C4) seems to follow straightforwardly from (C3) given EP; and (C5) just seems to 'unpack' the content of (C4). So, on the face of it, the Schmidentity Defence and Attack-the latter, in particular-deal a considerable blow to the metalinguistic account of identity.
Of course, Kripke has not given us any cause definitely to accept the objectual analysis of identity sentences in preference to the metalinguistic one; but he does appear to have given us just cause for resisting the metalinguistic account in spite of the fact aristro.doc that it, unlike the objectual account, offers an explanation of informative identity sentences. Now, although Kripke has not done so, there seems to be no obstacle to our making the same kind of move in the dispute between RTD and the ambiguity thesis. That is, in addition to defending RTD by means of the Russell-English Defence, one could-at no extra cost-discredit the ambiguity thesis itself by means of an argument mirroring the Schmidentity Attack.
So, Kripke's offensive line of reasoning is indeed a powerful weapon-if, that is, it is sound. But, as I shall now argue, the reasoning is invalid.
IV Post-Mortem. We can see that something is amiss with the offensive strategy when we note that the Schmidentity Attack, if successful, would discredit any theory which sought to accommodate the informativeness of identity sentences at the level of their semantic content.
Consider, for example, a theory which attempted to resolve the informativeness problem by ensuring that differences in Fregean sense were reflected at the level of semantic content.
9 Thus, would be regarded as expressing different propositions, as differing in literal content, in virtue of the fact that 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman' express different senses-i.e. are associated with different modes of presentation of (or ways of determining) their referents. Whatever the virtues of the theory, there is no problem refuting it by way of Kripke's offensive strategy. For, just as Schmenglish (allegedly) rules out, by stipulation, a metalinguistic explanation of informative Schmenglish identity sentences, it presumably also rules out a Fregean explanation. 10 Thus, the following argument apparently suffices:
[D] THE SECOND SCHMIDENTITY ATTACK (D1) The Fregean theory provides an explanation of the informativeness of English identity sentences. (D2) Schmenglish identity sentences would also be informative.
aristro.doc (D3) But the Fregean explanation, by stipulation, cannot be correct for the informativeness of Schmenglish identity sentences. (D4) So, the Fregean explanation does not really get to the heart of the informativeness problem. (D5) Hence, the Fregean explanation is probably not the correct explanation of the informativeness of English identity sentences.
The point is, the result of Kripke's thought-experiment, that Schmenglish identity sentences would be informative, clearly does not depend on which specific rival to the objectual account we happen to be considering. The argument would therefore go through, as I say, against any semantic solution to the informativeness problem. To my mind, this fact is pretty much a reductio of the offensive strategy. But what, one may well wonder, gives? Where, precisely, does this line of reasoning go wrong?
The upshot of the Schmidentity Attacks is that the explanations of the informativeness of identity sentences afforded by metalingistic accounts and Fregean accounts involving sense (or ways-of-determining-reference) are incorrect. But, the question arises, how are we to explain the phenomenon if not by appeal to the difference in the signs themselves, or in their sense, or the corresponding difference in the ways-ofdetermining-reference? For example, how can we explain the comparative difference of (1) relative to (2) but by appealing, either directly or indirectly, to such differences? For all that anyone has said on this matter, it seems quite obvious to me that one has to appeal to such differences as these to account for any differences in informativeness.
So what is it that the Schmidentity Attacks really establish if they do not establish that such accounts as these are incorrect? I claim that what they show, at best, is that such explanations need not be accommodated at the level of semantic content. For, if I am right, Kripke, and other supporters of the objectual account of identity sentences, must nevertheless resort, at the level of pragmatics or the theory of speech acts, to either the difference in the signs themselves, or in their sense, or in the ways-of-determiningreference, or some such thing which could equally well be reflected at the semantic level.
My contention, therefore, is that the Kripkean considerations, including the Schmenglish thought-experiments, discredit merely the view that such differences as the ones I have mentioned have to be reflected at the level of semantic content in order to resolve the informativeness problem. These considerations do not, however, discredit any theories which in fact do accommodate a semantic solution.
Which premiss of the Schmidentity Attacks are mistaken then? I suggest that the fault lies with (C3) and (D3), the premisses affirming that metalinguistic and Fregean explanations (of informative Schmenglish identity sentences) are ruled out, or preempted, by stipulation. What the stipulation rules out are such explanations at the level of semantic content; it does not rule out such explanations tout court.
A moral I am tempted to draw from all this, at any rate, as a result of all this, is that no semantic theory-no theory about the 'literal' content of English sentences, say-can be regarded as the correct one. Let me elaborate. We concluded our discussion of Kripke's offensive strategy with the observation that certain linguistic phenomena may be accounted for within the framework of a theory of pragmatics if not at the level aristro.doc of semantic content. This gives rise to the possibility of there being two semanticspragmatics 'packages' which accommodate different phenomena at the semantic level but accommodate the same phenomena overall-i.e. so that any phenomena explained by one package (either at the level of semantic content or at the level of pragmatics) is also explained by the other package (either at the level of semantic content or at the level of pragmatics). On this picture, a semantic theory does not face the tribunal of linguistic useage or phenomena by itself but together with the pragmatic theory it partners. Now, given two equally explanatory semantics-pragmatics packages, it just may not make sense to claim that one of these theories is the correct one: there just may be no fact of the matter that tells in favour of one theory over the other; indeed, some may see this as an obvious consequence of the hypothesis that the two packages are equally explanatory.
My claim should not be conflated with Quine's (1960) Indeterminacy of Translation thesis. It seems to me that someone could accept my conclusion while also maintaining that there is a 'fact of the matter' as to whether a certain phrase means suchand-such where the 'means' is understood as being neutral between 'pragmatically means' and 'semantically means'. The reasoning behind Quine's thesis would rule out even this much, I suspect. In effect, he rejects the determinacy of (propositional) content, whereas I am questioning not the determinacy of content but the determinacy of whether a proposition is the semantic content of a sentence (or an utterance) as opposed to its pragmatic content (as it were).
The moral I draw from the limitations of the Kripkean strategies, then, is that the 'dividing line' between semantics and pragmatics is a moveable feast; where we choose to draw the line is, in the main, up to us: some considerations may pull us in one direction while others pull in another; it does not really matter where precisely we draw the line, as long as the complete semantics-pragmatics package we have explains what we want explained. On this picture, it really would not make sense to talk of the correct semantic theory.
This conclusion echoes Strawson's (1974) comments about 'the correct' account of, what he calls, descriptive names, a category which would include descriptions (used referentially); the parallel is clear if we take logical form to be on a par with semantic content:
The mistake is to think that there must always be just one correct way of fitting the facts of discourse into the framework of logic ... there is no wholly realistic way of fitting all the facts into the framework of logic. There is nothing to deplore in this. To think that there was, to resist this conclusion à outrance, would be to misunderstand the character both of logic and of common discourse. The lack of perfect fit between them is not an imperfection in either. (1974, pp. 64-66) .
And Sainsbury (1979) floats a similar story (p. 126 ff.). Of course, we can agree with Sainsbury (p. 133 ) that a preference for the simplest, unified semantic theory may tell in favour of one adequate package over another; but we would still need independent arguments for the suppositions:
aristro.doc (a) that an adequate semantics-pragmatics package with the simplest, unified semantics provides the correct theory; and (b) that the considerations we employ will pick out a unique package.
I am not aware of any convincing arguments. This seems a suitable terminus for our methodological reflections. Kripke's defensive strategy, I have suggested, is sound; though, as I have attempted to show, the strategy has little bite if the occurrences of 'would' are given a weak reading. My concern in this concluding section has been to give a sketch of where I think Kripke's offensive line of reasoning really leads. Some readers may regard the moral I draw an obvious one, not meriting the rather tortuous route I have taken to get to it. But it is a conclusion which clearly needs to be aired more frequently than it is-Kripke's schmidentity argument, for example, would not, one hopes, have been so readily accepted if that had been the case. 
